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RECENT DECISIONS

ability alone will suffice to permit a court to assert in personam jurisdiction over the defendant in a tort action.
The Roche court attempted to limit its holding by stating: "Here the
normal usage of the product [truck] almost inevitably would bring it into
New Jersey. That is the deciding factor. It is therefore not necessary to
speculate upon what our holding would be if J.C.'s plant were further
away or in a different relative geographic location, or if J.C. completed
fewer trucks."'"
It is submitted that this case was an unexpected and unwarranted
extension of in personam jurisdiction. It is possible that without guidance
from the United States Supreme Court the Roche case, if followed, could
expand the jurisdiction of any state over any foreign corporation if the
state feels that the foreign corporation has wronged one of its domiciliaries. Whether this is good or bad is not in question, but it is submitted
that to do it under the guise of minimum contacts when none in fact exist
is clearly erroneous. It would subject corporations to in personam jurisdiction anywhere without regard to state jurisdictional patterns of power.
It is time for the Supreme Court to clarify the jurisdictional guidelines of
InternationalShoe and Hanson.
Louis P. Vitti

EvIDENCE-Parol evidence rule does not bar testimony concerning procurement of bank financing as an oral condition
precedent to the formation of a contract for home improvements that
did not mention financing, since the oral agreement did not contradict
the main body of the written contract, despite the inclusion of an "integration clause."
CONTRACTS-PAROL

Luther Williams, Jr., Inc. v. Johnson, 229 A.2d 163 (D.C. Ct. App.
1967).
Appellant sought to recover liquidated damages under a contract for
improvements on appellee's home. The contract in question contained
the following "integration clause": "This contract embodies the entire
understanding between the parties, and there are no verbal agreements
or representations in connection therewith."' Appellees testified that the
contract never came into existence because of an unfulfilled condition
precedent to the formation of the contract. Appellant objected to the
introduction of the testimony concerning the parol agreement for financing, and later objected to the jury being instructed to find for the
21. 232 A.2d at 167.
1. Luther Williams, Jr., Inc. v. Johnson, 229 A.2d 163 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967), at 165.
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defendants if the jury determined that the negotiations regarding the
condition precedent of ability to obtain financing had taken place and
that the contract was not to come into existence unless financing was
first obtained. The objections were overruled, and the jury returned a
verdict for appellees, which the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
affirmed in the instant decision.
When the parties to a contract intend to embody all the terms of their
agreement in a written instrument, intending that the written instrument
be the final expression of their agreement, the parol evidence rule affords
special protection to the writing by making inoperative any prior or contemporaneous agreements which seek to vary or contradict the terms
of the integrated writing. 2 A judge rather than a jury determines if there
was an integrated writing before affording protection to the written instrument by the use of the parol evidence rule.3
In determining if the parties to a contract intended to create an integrated writing, judges have generally given conclusive effect to an
"integration clause." 4 The rationale for this conclusion is that the overt
act of including an "integration clause" is evidence that the parties must
have intended an integrated writing,5 especially in view of the fact that
even written instruments not containing "integration clauses" have been
deemed as creating a strong presumption that the agreement in the instrument is integrated.' Thus when an "integration clause" is present in
a written instrument, the majority of courts take the view that evidence
of any oral condition precedent to the formation of the contract is contradictory to the "integration clause" and therefore violative of the parol
2. 3 A. CoRBN , CONTRACTS § 578 (2d ed. 1960); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 237 (1932);
4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 631 (3d ed. 1961).
3. Murray, The Parol Evidence Rule: A Clarification,4 DUQUESNE L. REV. 340 (1966).
4. J & J Constr. Co. v. Mayernik, 241 Or. 537, 407 P.2d 625 (1965); Mandracchia v.
McKeen, 167 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1957); Land Fin. Corp. v. Sherwin Elec. Co., 102 Vt. 73, 146
A. 72 (1929); Schuster v. Hotel Co., 106 Neb. 672, 184 N.W. 136 (1921); Meyer v. Armstrong, 49 Wash. 2d 598, 304 P.2d 710 (1956) ; A. CORBIN, supra note 2, § 578; S. WILLISTON,
supra note 2, § 634, at 1026; When an "integration clause" is not present, evidence that the
writing is nonintegrated may be admissible. City Nat'l Bank of Anchorage v. Moliter, 63
Wash. 2d 737, 388 P.2d 936 (1964); Walker & Laberge Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston,
206 Va. 683, 146 S.E.2d 239 (1966); Fugate v. Cook, 236 Cal. App. 2d 700, 46 Cal. Rptr.
291 (1965); Hunt Foods & Indus. Inc. v. Doliner, 49 Misc. 2d 346, 267 N.Y.S.2d 364, rev'd
other grounds, 26 App. Div. 2d 41, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966); 14 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. R.v. 52
(1958); 13 U. PrrT. L. REv. 760 (1952).
5. See New Prague Flouring Mill Co. v. Hewett Grain & Provision Co., 226 Mich. 35,
196 N.W. 890 (1924); Bressler and Taylor, A Critique of the Parol Evidence Rule in
Pennsylvania, 100 U. PA. L. Rxv. 703 (1952).
6. See Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Mach. Co., 141 U.S. 510, 517 (1891); Townsend
v. Standard Indus. Inc., 235 Ark. 951, 363 S.W.2d 535 (1963); Rath v. Schoon, 192 Iowa
180, 182 N.W. 180 (1921); Garden State Plaza Corp. v. Kresge Co., 78 N.J. Super. 485, 189
A.2d 448 (1963); A. CoRIN, supra note 2, § 578, 403, n.39, 405; 5 S. WILLISTON, supra note
2, § 811, at 887, 890; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 573 (1932).
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evidence rule.7 However the courts in rare cases of fraud or mistake, or
on some ground that is usually sufficient to set aside any type of contract,
will not give conclusive effect to an "integration clause."'
Associate Judge Quinn9 rejected giving conclusive effect to an "integration clause" in a written instrument in the instant case stating that
despite the presence of an "integration clause," parol evidence could be
admitted to show that a condition precedent existed. Judge Quinn believed that the "integration clause" should be considered only as additional evidence along with the conduct and language of the parties and
all the surrounding circumstances in determining if the parties intended
to create an itegrated writing. Judge Quinn quoted with approval from
Wigmore on Evidence,1° which in essence stated that the judge must look
outside the written instrument in order to determine the intention of
both parties to the written contract; that in order to determine if the
writing was intended to be integrated, the court must first learn orally
from each party all the terms and conditions of their contract and then
determine if the conditions were included in the body of the written instrument; that if an oral condition or term of the contract is dealt with
at all in the written instrument, then presumably the subject was intended
by the parties to be integrated and such evidence of an oral condition or
term would be inadmissible under the parol evidence rule if it contradicted or varied the terms of the integrated writing. Judge Quinn decided
that procurement of bank financing as an oral condition precedent to the
formation of the contract for home improvements was not specifically
mentioned in the written instrument, therefore he decided the writing
was not intended by the parties to be integrated, and therefore the admission of evidence of the oral condition in the lower court did not
violate the parol evidence rule."
The court in the instant case stated that it was clear from the Illustration in § 241 of The Restatement of Contracts,'1 2 that parol evidence
relating to conditions precedent should not be excluded because of an
"integration clause," as violative of the parol evidence rule,'" but excluded only when the alleged oral condition precedent to the formation
of the contract contradicts the "integration clause" and some other
specific term of the written instrument, but the court did not give any
7. Note 4, supra.
8. Id.
9. With whom Hood, C.J., and Myers, J., concur.
10. 9 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDEzNCE § 2430 (3d ed. 1940).
11. Not all written statements of fact are necessarily true because they are written and
therefore Professor Corbin does not believe that an "integration clause" necessarily represents the true intention of the.parties, A. CORBiN, supra note 2, §§ 578, 582.
12. (1932).
13. Note 2, supra.
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reason as to why it was clear, and merely quoted The Restatement of
Contracts § 241 as follows:
Where parties to a writing which purports to be an integration
of a contract between them orally agree, before or contemporaneously with the making of the writing, that it shall not
become binding until a future day or until the happening of a
future event, the oral agreement is operative if there is nothing
in the writing inconsistent therewith. (Emphasis added.) Illustration: A and B make and sign a writing in which A promises to sell and B promises to buy goods of a certain description at a stated price. The parties at the same time orally agree
that the writing shall not take effect unless within ten days
their local railroad has cars available for shipping the goods.
The oral agreement is operative according to its terms. If,
however, the writing provided 'delivery shall be made within
thirty days' from the date of the writing, the oral agreement is
inoperative.
The Illustration does not contain an "integration clause" nor the
dilemma caused by an "integration clause," and therefore the court
should have stated some rationale as to why it was clear from the
Illustration that evidence should not be excluded because of an "integration clause," as violative of the parol evidence rule, but excluded only
when the alleged oral condition precedent to the formation of the contract
contradicts the "integration clause" plus some other specific term of the
written agreement.
One writer has stated that there is a distinction between varying, contradicting, or adding to a written agreement and showing by oral evidence
that a writing was not intended to be legally binding until a condition
precedent was fulfilled. 4 This writer's view is that an "integration
clause" presupposes that a contract is in existence since without such a
contract being proved there is nothing to give the written instrument
legal effect and consequently nothing to give the "integration clause" any
legal effect." The writer states:
A condition precedent may be shown [under Restatement
§ 241] 'if there is nothing in the writing inconsistent therewith.' It might be argued that a literal application of this rule
would emasculate the entire doctrine [that conditions in a
contract are operative only if a contract is shown to exist],
inasmuch as any condition precedent is inconsistent with a writ14. Comment, Special Provisions in Contracts to Exclude Contentions Based Upon
Parol Evidence, 32 Isaanols L. REv. 938, 949 (1936).
15. Id.
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ing purporting to be a complete binding contract. It would
seem to assume the very question in issue by giving effect to
a provision of the writing when the question is whether the provisions of the writing collectively and severally are to be given
effect at all. Certainly if the provision is to be given conclusive
effect, as apparently is intended, this objection is valid. However, if the provision may be considered as evidentiary merely,
the rule is desirable in directing attention to it. The provision
should be utilized in court as an admission or a prior inconsistent statement of the party seeking to establish the condition precedent.' 6 (Footnotes omitted.)
David J. Kozma

CRIMINAL LAw-DISCLOSURE OF IDENTITY OF EYEWITNESS INFORMER-

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that the governmental
privilege' to refrain from disclosing the identity of an informer does not
limit the duty of the prosecution to make available the name and whereabouts of all material eyewitnesses to the defense.
Commonwealth v. Carter,427 Pa. 53, 233 A.2d 284 (1967).
Norton Wilder, an undercover agent for the Philadelphia Police force and
the prosecution's principal witness testified that he went to a street corner
in Philadelphia where he was introduced to the appellant, Carter. Wilder
was accompanied by an informer and both were under the surveillance
of a federal narcotics agent. Wilder testified that after being introduced
to the appellant, the appellant sold heroin to the informer in the presence
of Wilder. The agent for the Federal Bureau of Narcotics testified that he
saw Wilder, appellant, and the informer conversing at the scene of the
alleged sale. The agent, who was sitting in an automobile parked a half
block away, stated that he did not see the transaction but that he did
recognize the appellant.
The appellant was arrested two months after the alleged sale and
indicted for the felonious possession and sale of narcotic drugs. At the
jury trial counsel for appellant asked Wilder to disclose the name of the
informant. The prosecution objected and the trial judge sustained the
objection. The defense at the close of the Commonwealth's case made a
motion to have the case dismissed because of the Commonwealth's failure
16. Id.
1. In n.3, at 56 of 427 Pa. 53, and at 285 of 233 A.2d 284 (1967), it is stated that
"neither statute nor appellate decision in Pennsylvania has yet recognized such a privilege.
To simplify the issues in this appeal, we have assumed without deciding such a privilege
exists."

